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Strict Property Tax Caps:
A Case Study of Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, its
Shortcomings, and the Path Forward
TREVOR J. BROWN*
ABSTRACT
Strict property tax caps are statutory measures that limit municipalities
from raising property taxes by more than a certain percentage each fiscal
year. In addition, they place a ceiling on the total amount of real and personal
property tax revenue a municipality can raise annually. Often spearheaded
by voter initiative, strict property tax caps are championed by proponents as
a way to limit taxes and increase civic participation. Conversely, detractors
frame caps as artificial barriers that improperly constrain local governments
in their taxing powers.
Massachusetts voters approved a strict property tax cap, Proposition 2 ½,
in 1980. Proposition 2 ½ provides that communities may increase taxes on
real and personal property annually by no more than 2.5% of the total fair
cash value of such property. Further, it states that the total annual property
tax revenue raised by municipalities cannot surpass 2.5% of the assessed value
of all taxable property in each community.
In the three-and-a-half decades since Proposition 2 ½ was adopted, many
cities and towns have found that they cannot raise sufficient revenue to meet
their communities’ needs because of the restrictions imposed by the cap.
However, the statute does contain a side-step maneuver: a community can
override its levy limit with a majority vote.
This Note examines the total number of override votes—attempted and
successful—from 1980 through 2010. In doing so, it assesses the impact
Proposition 2 ½ has had and is continuing to have on municipalities, namely
the services local governments provide to their residents. The data indicates
that the number of proposed override votes has increased over time, as
communities have found that they are unable to meet their needs under the
2.5% increase limit. Further, the vote totals make clear that successful
override votes happen more frequently in wealthier communities versus poorer
communities.
Based on this data, this Note argues that Proposition 2 ½’s 2.5% levy cap
is an unrealistic and artificial barrier. Strict property tax caps place arbitrary
limits on the amounts municipalities can raise taxes, without regard to changes
in inflation, the cost of providing services, or community needs. The Note
concludes by suggesting potential alternatives moving forward.
*

University of New Hampshire School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2018; Saint
Michael’s College, B.A. 2015.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A distaste for taxes has marked the American spirit from the time of the
country’s founding.1
From rallying cries of “no taxation without
representation,” to “read my lips: no new taxes,” a revulsion to state-imposed
levies—even those used to provide heavily utilized social services—permeates
American history.2 Beginning in the early 1980s, the conservative resurgence,
1

See JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2017) (discussing factors fueling the
American Revolution).
2
George H.W. Bush, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Republican National Convention in New Orleans - August 18, 1988, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(Jan.
24,
2017,
3:17
PM),
THE
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emboldened by the rise of Ronald Reagan, pushed to cut taxes at all levels of
government.3 Against this backdrop, a number of states instituted strict
property tax caps, often by ballot initiative.4 One such state was
Massachusetts, which adopted Proposition 2 ½ in 1980.5
A brief overview of the framework of strict property tax caps is covered
in Part I. In short, strict property tax caps limit the percentage communities
can increase property taxes in any one year.6 Proposition 2 ½, for example,
places a ceiling on the total annual property tax revenue that a municipality
can raise: 2.5% of the total assessed value of the taxable property in the
community.7 It also prohibits communities from levying an increase in taxes
of more than 2.5% per year of the total full and fair cash value of all taxable
real and personal property.8
Part II details the history of strict property tax caps.9 In Massachusetts,
the strict property tax cap scheme saw defeat on Beacon Hill before being
overwhelmingly approved by voters in November of 1980.10 This Note not
only considers the history of Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, but also
discusses how the vast majority of states that have strict property tax caps have
had them implemented through plebiscite rather than by legislatures.11
Part III examines Proposition 2 ½ override voting data from each of
Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns, from 1983 (when the first override vote
took place) through 2010.12 The data shows a dramatic increase in the number
of proposed override votes over time, as municipalities have become
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955 [https://perma.cc/3YL2-RY4F]; see
generally HENRY M. GLADNEY, NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: 1768
PETITION, MEMORIAL, AND REMONSTRANCE (2014).
3
John Samples, Limiting Government, 1980 – 2010, CATO INSTITUTE, Mar./Apr.
2010,
https://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2010/limiting-government1980-2010 [https://perma.cc/VZD6-HUWC].
4
Hector Chang & Christine Wen, Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for New
York, CORNELL U. DEP’T OF CITY & REGIONAL PLAN. CREATIVE RESPONSES TO
FISCAL STRESS PROJECT (Dec. 2014).
5
Barbara Anderson, From Barbara Anderson, A Little History, BOS. GLOBE
(May
5,
2008),
http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/regional_editions/overridecentral/2008/05/bar
bara_anderso.html [https://perma.cc/HG7P-5P2X].
6
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., LEVY LIMITS: A PRIMER ON
PROPOSITION 2 ½ (June 2007).
7
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
8
Id.
9
See generally Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research
Foundation, Celebrating Proposition 2 ½ after 30 Years, CITIZENS FOR LIMITED
TAXATION (Nov. 4, 2010), http://cltg.org/cltg/Prop_2/index.htm.
10
Id.
11
See generally Chang & Wen, supra, note 4.
12
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011).
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increasingly unable to meet their obligations under the 2.5% cap.13 From
Fiscal Year 1983 through 1989, the average number of override votes in the
entire Commonwealth was 69 votes per year.14 Between Fiscal Year 2000
through 2009, however, that number had risen to 118 votes per year.15
Additionally, the data indicates that wealthier communities are far more likely
to approve override votes versus poorer communities.16 In communities where
the median household income is less than $49,999, the success rate of an
override vote is 27.125%.17 At the opposite end of the spectrum, in
communities where the median household income exceeds $125,000, an
override vote has a 69.435% chance of passing.18 Through examining the
voting data of municipalities in Massachusetts, it becomes clear that the
current system leads to dramatic discrepancies in municipal services between
communities based on wealth.
Consequently, this Note argues that although these measures have proven
popular with voters, they present obstacles to efficient municipal governing
and impose arbitrary limits on municipal taxing abilities.19 Proposition 2 ½’s
formula is in need of reform, as municipalities cannot operate under current
constraints, and the framework of the law favors wealthy communities over
poorer communities, leading to a bifurcation of services between towns.
Moreover, while the intent of Proposition 2 ½ was to afford communities
greater local control and to curb rising property taxes, the measure has created
a more muddled situation.20 Even with an override measure in place, many
communities have been unable to meet their obligations.21 This issue has been
exacerbated given that the needs of many communities have significantly
changed since 1980—the rate of inflation has consistently outpaced levy
limits, and local aid has failed to materialize, all while Proposition 2 ½ has not
changed.22
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011); MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF
LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET
FY1983-2010 (2011).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Charles Kenney, Massachusetts Makes a Comeback, BOSTON GLOBE MAG.,
May 18, 1986, at 1–7.
20
Allan R. Gold, In Massachusetts, Budgets That Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/15/us/in-massachusetts-budgets-thathurt.html [https://perma.cc/WQU7-AGPF].
21
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011).
22
Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, Jan. 24,
2017,
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/
14
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To remedy these difficulties, Part IV suggests several policy
recommendations which could serve as alternatives to strict property tax caps.
Potential reforms could include indexing the cap to the rate of inflation rather
than holding it to a strict figure; or replacing the system with a cap on the total
amount municipal budgets can increase each year, rather than a cap on the
amount taxes can be increased.23 This Note concludes by arguing that
Massachusetts, and other states that employ strict property tax caps, should
consider alternatives that embrace the rationale behind strict property tax
caps—stronger local control and a desire for greater government efficiency—
while allowing local governments the flexibility necessary to react to changing
needs.
II. OVERVIEW
Strict property tax caps are statutory measures aimed at controlling the
future growth of property taxes by limiting the ability of local governments to
increase taxes above a certain percentage.24 While different states have
implemented various formulas and percentages for calculating tax caps, the
central purpose is the same: to limit local property taxes.25
Under Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, a ceiling is placed on
municipalities’ ability to raise taxes.26 The increase limit, or levy limit, is the
maximum amount a municipality can increase taxes on a yearly basis.27
Proposition 2 ½ mandates that municipalities cannot increase property taxes
by more than 2.5% annually.28 Further, communities cannot impose a property
tax rate greater than 2.5% of the assessed “full and fair cash value” of all
taxable real and personal property in the community.29
The limitations imposed on tax increases have exceptions, however. For
example, if new property is added to the tax roles, it is not included in
calculating the ceiling.30 This exception for “new growth” allows for the tax
[https://perma.cc/2Q2M-8EDN]; Luc Schuster, The Rise and Fall of Local Aid in
Massachusetts, MASSACHUSETTS BUDGET AND POLICY CENTER (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=local_aid_long_term.html
[https://perma.cc/G244-27EM].
23
C. CHRISTINE FILMORE, N.H. TOWN & CITY, WHAT IS NEW IN MUNICIPAL
BUDGETING? (Sept./Oct. 2013).
24
Hector Chang & Christine Wen, Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for New
York, CORNELL U. DEP’T OF CITY & REGIONAL PLAN. CREATIVE RESPONSES TO
FISCAL STRESS PROJECT (Dec. 2014).
25
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016); Chang & Wen, supra note 4.
26
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
27
Id.
28
Id. The level limit will at most be equal to the levy ceiling (2.5% maximum
increase year to year); the levy limit cannot exceed the levy ceiling.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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levy to be increased by the amount of taxes collected from the new property,
without affecting the ceiling.31 Additionally, the 2.5% cap and increase limits
can be exempted for specific purposes. “Capital exclusions,” if approved by a
majority of voters, allow for the omission of capital expenditures from
Proposition 2 ½’s limitations.32 Similarly, “debt exclusions,” with majority
approval, are excluded if the new debt is being incurred for a specific
purpose.33 Finally, tax increases for water/sewer system construction are
excluded from Proposition 2 ½’s limitations.34
Proposition 2 ½ also allows for override votes. By majority vote, a
community can permanently increase its levy limit.35 A specific dollar amount
must be put to ballot, together with a stated purpose for what the funds
generated from the tax increase will go towards.36 Proposition 2 ½ overrides
must be used to fund municipal operating budgets, not to fund capital
projects.37 Some communities that have attempted override votes have chosen
to request large sums for “general operating expenses,” while others have
multiple votes in a single year, each corresponding to a specific line item in
the budget.38 When Proposition 2 ½ was passed in 1980, a two-thirds majority
vote was required in order to approve an override; this requirement was
amended by the General Court in 1981 so that only a majority vote is needed
to successfully increase a community’s levy limit above the cap.39
Similarly, Proposition 2 ½ also allows for underride votes. A community
can reduce its levy limit by a majority vote, or by petitioning the state

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. (such as municipal bonds issued for capital expenditures that extend beyond
the current year. Note that both capital and debt exclusions originally required a twothirds vote by voters in order to be exempt from the limitation on tax levy increases,
but the requirement was reduced to a majority vote by a 1981 amendment passed by
the Massachusetts General Court).
34
Id. (provision must be accepted by the “local appropriating authority,” and
approved by a majority vote of the community).
35
Id.
36
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., PROPOSITION 2 1/2 BALLOT
QUESTIONS (Oct. 19, 2013).
37
Robert David Sullivan, Two and a Half Decades of Prop. 2 ½,
COMMONWEALTH MAG., Winter 2005, at 26; capital projects are excluded from
Proposition 2 ½’s limits, as discussed above.
38
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011) (some communities
have had dozens of votes in a single year for smaller amounts of money, for everything
from town Christmas lights, to replacing dasher boards on the town skating rink; the
norm, however, is to request funds for the general operating budget).
39
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE-LOCAL
RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 64 (1995).
32
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legislature for a reduction.40 Even if an underride vote is successful, only the
ceiling is reduced; the increase limit, which prevents municipalities from
increasing property taxes annually beyond 2.5%, is still in place.41 If an
underride vote is successful, the levy limit can later be increased by a
successful override vote.
In Massachusetts, taxes levied on real and personal property constitute
“the main tax imposed by cities and towns, and is usually their largest source
of revenue.”42 The amount of money a community raises in property taxes
must be sufficient to fund: all town “appropriations, [services,] a reserve for
abatements and exemptions, and other amounts required by law to be raised”
minus “estimated receipts from state and local sources and appropriations from
available funds and reserves.”43 The majority of municipal operating budgets
are funded through property taxes.44 Consequently, a cap on municipalities’
ability to raise property taxes above a certain level can have a dramatic impact
on a community’s ability to provide services, as well as its overall fiscal wellbeing.
III. HISTORY OF STRICT PROPERTY TAX CAPS
A. The Beginnings: California’s Proposition 13
California introduced the first state-wide limitation on local governments’
abilities to levy property taxes with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.45
Passed by voter initiative, Proposition 13 amended the California Constitution
to fix property taxes at no more than 1% of real value, in addition to restricting
annual increases to the rate of inflation, not to exceed 2%.46 Override votes
are allowed if the revenue from the proposed tax increases are approved by
two-thirds of voters.47
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the legality of
California’s strict property tax cap regime.48 The Court specifically looked at
Proposition 13’s framework for reassessment of taxes upon the sale of
property, which can result in one landowner paying higher taxes than his
neighbors.49 The Court found that California’s exemption scheme was
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
Id.
KATHLEEN COLLEARY, MASSACHUSETTS MUNICIPAL LAW § 6.2.1 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Chang & Wen, supra note 4.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1; Chang & Wen, supra note 4.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1 (with the reassessed value becoming the new

basis).
48
49

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992).
Id.

366

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

Constitutional, as it furthered a legitimate purpose, and did not discriminate
with respect to the tax rate, nor with respect to the annual rate of assessment
adjustments.50
The impact of Proposition 13 on California is unclear, as multiple
exceptions have been added to the policy over the subsequent four decades.51
For example, whenever property is sold in California, it is reassessed, thereby
changing the taxes (although not the tax rate) on the property.52 Cities and
towns are also permitted to create “local improvement districts.”53 Once such
districts are approved by voters, the property within the district is exempt from
the Proposition 13 tax cap.54 In exchange for this exemption, property owners
within the “improvement districts” must then directly pay for infrastructure
improvements, such as sidewalk construction and storm-water systems.55
Although Proposition 13 provided a framework for other states looking to
adopt strict property tax caps, it can hardly be said that California currently
has any sort of strict property tax-cap scheme. Rather, it has a system so
riddled with exceptions that there is no coherent structure left, resulting in a
number of undesirable consequences. Land-use decisions have been made
based on the ability of land to generate revenue, rather than on need.56
Complex methods to circumvent the system, whether through the creation of
local improvement districts or otherwise, have multiplied.57 Significantly, the
cap led to a dramatic decrease in local revenue.58 In Fiscal Year 1980, the first
year after the cap went into effect, county property tax revenue dropped from
$10.3 billion to $5.04 billion.59 The ensuing crisis led to a one-time $4.85
billion bailout by the state for municipalities, together with an increase of state
control over local finances.60
B.

Massachusetts

Following California’s adoption, the strict property tax cap movement
quickly spread east, with Massachusetts approving Proposition 2 ½ in 1980.61
Unlike California’s Proposition 13 which amended the state constitution,
50

Id.
Chang & Wen, supra note 4.
52
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1.
53
San Francisco Office of Economic and Workforce Development, Community
Benefit Districts, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2017),
http://oewd.org/community-benefit-districts [https://perma.cc/Q4JE-8E3T].
54
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1.
55
San Francisco Office of Economic and Workforce Development, supra note 53.
56
Chang & Wen, supra note 4.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
51
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Proposition 2 ½ is a law, subject to legislative repeal or amendment.62
Proposition 2 ½ was first presented as legislation in the Massachusetts House
of Representatives in 1980; it failed, 155 to 5 votes.63 At the time, the
overwhelming majority of state legislators saw it as a “destructive, smallminded, reactionary assault on public services,” with both Governor Edward
King and former Governor Michael Dukakis opposing it, too.64
Subsequently, Proposition 2 ½ was passed by ballot initiative.65 In
Massachusetts, the ballot initiative process was made a part of the
Massachusetts Constitution in 1918.66 Ballot initiatives allow individuals and
interest groups to advance their policy objectives; accordingly, almost all
states that have strict property tax caps have had them implemented through
citizen initiative.67 Using this tool, the advocacy group Citizens for Limited
Taxation spearheaded a state-wide signature collection drive for Proposition 2
½ following its defeat in the Statehouse.68 The group secured enough support
to place the petition on the November 1980 ballot.69
The measure passed overwhelmingly, with 59% of Massachusetts voters
supporting it.70 Consequently, Proposition 2 ½ became law, limiting
communities to imposing property taxes no greater than 2.5% of the “full and
fair cash value of real property,” and capping the annual increase in the tax
levy to 2.5%.71

62

Id.
See Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation,
supra note 9.
64
Kenney, supra note 19.
65
Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation,
supra note 9.
66
Dina E. Conlin, The Ballot Initiative in Massachusetts: The Fallacy of Direct
Democracy, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2004).
67
Id. at 1087–88; see generally Chang & Wen, supra note 4 (five out of the seven
states which have strict property tax caps have had them implemented through ballot
initiative: California (1978), Massachusetts (1980), Oregon (1990), Illinois (1991),
and Colorado (1992). Unsurprisingly, strict property tax caps have been far more
successful and expansive in states which allow voters to propose ballot questions as
opposed to those which only allow the state legislature to propose ballot questions.
Only New Jersey (2007) and New York (2012) have implemented strict property tax
caps through their state legislatures).
68
Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation,
supra note 9.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016) (in addition to the strict property tax
cap, Proposition 2 ½ implemented other reforms, including limiting the automobile
excise tax and eliminating school committee autonomy; these aspects of the statute are
outside the scope of this Note).
63
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In addition to introducing a strict property tax cap, the Proposition 2 ½
ballot measure included a number of other reforms.72 The law also reduced
the excise tax on personal property such as automobiles, boats, farm animals,
and machinery to 2.5%,73 down from 6.6%.74 Aside from the impact
Proposition 2 ½ had on municipal budgets because of reduced property tax
revenue, the reduction in revenue due to the reduced excise tax dramatically
affected municipalities in their own right.75 While the mechanics and impact
of these provisions of Proposition 2 ½ are outside of the scope of this Note, it
is important to note that if a community approves a general override vote, then
the local government can automatically increase the excise tax to 6.6% without
any authorization from the voters.76
C. Impetus
In addition to California and Massachusetts, five other states have some
form of strict property cap systems.77 The popularization of such caps can be
attributed to several factors. Anti-property tax sentiments developed across
the country in the late 1970s and 1980s through the growth of interest groups
promoting “taxpayer revolution[s]”, inspired by the “Reagan Revolution.”78
The so-called “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” was proposed and debated in
statehouses across the country, with several enacted.79 Strict property tax caps
fit into the broader societal push of the time, with proponents advocating these
measures not only as a way to limit the growth of taxes, but also to shrink the
size of state and local governments.80

72

Id.; Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation,
supra note 9. Significantly, the statute: forbid the Commonwealth from passing
unfunded mandates on cities and towns; repealed school board fiscal autonomy;
repealed compulsory binding arbitration for police and fire unions; and reconfigured
the Department of Revenue to include the Division on Local Services.
73
COLLEARY, supra note 42.
74
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
75
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39.
76
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016).
77
See Chang & Wen, supra note 4 (New York implemented a strict property tax
cap most recently, in 2012).
78
Steven V. Melnik & David S. Cenedella, Tax Assessment in New York State, 4
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 427 (2011); Ronald W. Reagan, Transcript of Reagan's Farewell
Address to the American People, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/12/news/transcript-of-reagan-s-farewell-addressto-american-people.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/B86C-9HU4].
79
See generally Andrew Reschovsky, Taxpayer Bill of Rights: A Solution to
Wisconsin’s Fiscal Problems or a Prescription for Future Fiscal Crises?, 88 MARQ.
L. REV. 135 (2004).
80
See generally id.
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Barbara Anderson, who later became the executive director of Citizens for
Limited Taxation, spearheaded the passage of Proposition 2 ½.81 She
attributed the success of Proposition 2 ½ as the culmination of a number of
factors: the combination of the conservative trends propelling Reagan to
office, and the desire by many voters for greater local control, helped to drive
the passage of Proposition 2 ½.82 Anderson also pointed to voter anger as a
driving factor behind the ballot question’s success.83 Voters were frustrated
with a legislature that was perceived as unresponsive to their needs and that
continued to tax heavily through economically depressed years.84 The popular
“override” of the legislature’s initial rejection of Proposition 2 ½ was a natural
outgrowth of this frustration. With no limit imposed on how high property
taxes could rise, Massachusetts had the highest property taxes in the country
in the years leading up to 1980.85 Consequently, the combination of voter
frustration, voter empowerment, and a desire for lower taxes led to
overwhelming support for the measure.
1. Legal Challenges in the Commonwealth
Despite the strong support Proposition 2 ½ saw at the ballot box, a little
over a week after it was approved by voters, three legal challenges were filed
– one by an individual taxpayer, another by a collation of objectors, and the
third by the Massachusetts Teachers Association, a politically-influential
union.86 The cases were consolidated and heard by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in early 1981.87 The plaintiffs advanced two arguments.
First, they argued that Proposition 2 ½ “was not a proper subject of an initiative
petition” and that the procedural requirements of the Massachusetts
Constitution were not adequately followed.88 Second, the plaintiffs challenged
whether a provision of the law relating to a deduction from taxable income on
rent paid violated equal protection under the state Constitution.89
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that in both
substance and form, the petition was appropriate.90 The Court found that the
initiative petition was properly originated by ten qualified voters, and then sent
to the Attorney General.91 Further, the Court concluded that the Attorney
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Anderson, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Kenney, supra note 19.
Anderson, supra note 5.
Mass. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 213–14 (1981).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236–38.
Id. at 217.
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General’s summary of the law for the ballot was a fair summation of the act,
and that an amendment to the measure was procedurally sound.92 With regards
to the question over the renter’s deduction provision, the Court held that it did
not violate Constitutional requirements of equal protection.93 In concluding
that Proposition 2 ½ was lawfully adopted, and that it did not violate either the
Massachusetts Constitution or the United States’ Constitution, the Court gave
a major victory to the anti-tax proponents of the measure.94
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld, in a
related action, the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of
Revenue to issue guidelines to cities and towns for determining the “full and
fair cash value” of property when calculating levy limits.95 Even where such
guidelines did not give individualized considerations for variations between
communities, the Court stated that the Commissioner had the power to
promulgate such regulations.96 The success of Proposition 2 ½ in the face of
legal challenges inspired advocates of strict property tax caps in other
jurisdictions, with a number of other states implementing similar measures in
subsequent years.97
2. Immediate & Short-Term Impact
At the time Proposition 2 ½ was passed, local governments that imposed
property taxes exceeding the 2.5% limit were required to reduce their tax levies
by 15% annually until the cap was reached.98 Boston, for example, had a tax
rate in 1980 equal to 10% of the full and fair cash value of all the real property
within the city limits.99 Across the Commonwealth, “[b]y the autumn of 1981,
approximately 15,000 city, town, and county employees had been laid off.”100
In 1982, local revenue dropped by approximately $500 million; the impact of
reduced revenue was mitigated only by an increase of $265 million in local
aid.101 Proposition 2 ½ ultimately resulted in the proportion of local revenue
raised by property taxes decreasing from nearly two-third prior to 1980, to
approximately one-half of municipal budgets today.102
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Despite the fears of many politicians and citizens, Proposition 2 ½ did not
initially have a devastating impact on cities and towns. Rather, the statute took
effect at the same time as the “Massachusetts Miracle,” a period of rapid
economic growth in the Commonwealth after a decade of decline.103 Coupled
with falling primary and secondary school enrollment, municipalities and
school districts were able to reduce their budgets without drastically cutting
services.104 Along with lower-than-forecasted energy costs and decisions to
defer spending on maintenance, communities avoided the worst predictions
about Proposition 2 ½.105 As previously noted, the strengthening economy
allowed the General Court to provide a substantial increase in local aid in
Fiscal Year 1983.106 Thus, timing was key in blunting the impact of
Proposition 2 ½ at the time of its implementation.107
From 1980 to 1985, property taxes in Massachusetts fell from 76% above
the national average to 13% above the national average.108 As of 2017, the
Commonwealth has the eighth highest property taxes in the country,
significantly lower than the number one slot Massachusetts occupied during
the years leading up to Proposition 2 ½’s passage.109
Beyond the initial reduction in local property taxes seen because of the
measure, there were non-economic outcomes that grew from the passage of
Proposition 2 ½. Many commentators at the time noted that Proposition 2 ½
was less about lowering taxes and more about voter empowerment in the face
of an unresponsive Beacon Hill.110 Following the passage of Proposition 2 ½,
The Boston Globe Magazine noted that the exercise of voters’ will through
plebiscite revived a sense of accountability in elected officials on both the local
and state levels.111 The subsequent trimming of municipal positions, required
because of reduced budgets, led to a reduction in cronyism, and higher quality
individuals being retained.112 In the short-term, several favorable outcomes
occurred as a result of Proposition 2 ½’s passage.
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3. Long-Term Impact
While the initial impact of Proposition 2 ½ was not the widespread
devastation that many had feared, the long-term effects of the law cannot be
understated. Though the reduction in property taxes was welcomed by voters,
in the long term, the cap imposed by Proposition 2 ½ has significantly
impacted municipalities’ abilities to provide services. Due to Proposition 2
½’s cap, “many Massachusetts localities are experiencing cost increases [for
providing services] beyond their control that far exceed their annual property
tax growth threshold.”113 For example, health care costs dramatically impact
municipal budgets.114 From 2001 to 2006, municipal health care costs grew
by 13%, increasing from 7.4% to 10.6%, on average, of municipal budgets in
Massachusetts.115 Despite this increase in costs, cities and towns are unable to
increase property taxes, the main source of municipal revenue, beyond the
2.5% cap.116 Consequently, in order to address fixed costs, other areas of
municipal budgets have been cut. Examining the hundreds of override votes
proposed over the past few years, overrides are routinely floated by
communities in order to support everything from high school sports and
extracurriculars, to keeping operating budgets “level.”117
Despite an initial increase in local aid from Fiscal Year 1982 to 1983, the
bump was short-lived: today, local aid is approximately one-half of what it
was three decades ago.118 This cut in state aid, combined with the restrictions
Proposition 2 ½ places on communities’ abilities to raise funds for services,
has led to a number of unintended consequences. As early as 1988, The New
York Times reported a “snowball[] effect”, as more and more towns were
attempting override votes, because the amount of revenue growth under the
cap was “not sufficient to keep up with inflation.”119
Aside from the financial burden that Proposition 2 ½ has imposed, the
measure has also significantly strained relations between municipal
governments and the Commonwealth. With their ability to raise revenue
constrained, cities and towns now routinely petition the latter for funds.120
Taken together, both the financial and non-financial impacts of Proposition 2
½ have been much deeper than any of the proponents could have initially
forecast.
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4. Override Votes
The impact Proposition 2 ½ has had on municipalities has been amplified
by the law’s override measure. The framework of Proposition 2 ½ is such that
each community has a levy limit: the amount real and personal property taxes
can be increased each year, which is 2.5%.121 The levy limit can be increased
up to the levy ceiling, which is equal to 2.5% of the full and fair cash value of
the property in a community.122 Generally, the levy ceiling changes every
year, as “properties are added or removed from the tax roll and market values
increase or decrease,” thus causing the value of taxable property in a
community to change.123
Each year, a community’s levy limit automatically increases 2.5% over
the previous year’s levy limit.124 Beyond that, communities are able to
increase their levy limits if there is new growth in the tax base (such as the
development of a new subdivision).125 Finally, and most significantly, a
community can override its levy limit through a majority vote for a specific
dollar amount; if successful, the levy limit base is permanently increased by
the amount of the override.126 While the original law only allowed
municipalities to hold override votes if approved by the General Court, and
required approval by two-thirds of voters in the municipality, a 1981
amendment by the legislature removed the first requirement.127 City councils,
mayors, or selectmen are allowed to place override questions on the local
ballot.128 Additionally, the two-thirds requirement was reduced to a simple
majority vote.129
The override measure allows communities to override the 2.5% limit, and
increase their property taxes beyond this threshold.130 As discussed below, the
data makes clear that this model significantly favors wealthier communities

MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., supra note 6.
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over poorer communities, resulting in widespread discrepancies across the
Commonwealth in the level and in extent of municipal services provided.131
5.

Arguments for Retaining Proposition 2 ½

The arguments for retaining (or in the case of other states, implementing)
strict property tax caps largely mirror the arguments which propelled the initial
passage of such measures: greater local control, smaller government, and
lower taxes.132 Perhaps the strongest argument for retaining a strict property
tax cap in Massachusetts can be found in the Commonwealth’s tax rate itself.
Massachusetts, though it has the eighth highest property taxes per capita
(38.4% higher than the national average), has fallen sharply from the number
one slot it occupied prior to the implementation of the cap.133 Although the
number eight slot is still high, it is critical to note that Massachusetts localities
are forced to rely more heavily on property tax revenues to fund local
expenditures as compared to municipalities in other states.134 Unlike in other
states, Massachusetts cities and towns are not permitted to levy other forms of
taxes (such as sales or income taxes).135
In 2000, the polling firm Lane & Company conducted a study
extrapolating the difference between what taxpayers in certain communities
would be paying if Proposition 2 ½ had never passed, versus what they paid
under the current system.136 The study found that from 1983 to 2000, the per
capita residential property tax levy dropped 1.6%, after adjusting for
inflation.137 Despite the “savings” in property taxes this study found, it did not
take into account other ramifications of the cap, such as increased fees or cuts
in municipal services.
“When local officials want more money than the levy limit allows, they
must ask for it, instead of just taking it as they did before 1980,” noted Barbara
Anderson, of Citizens for Limited Taxation; “[c]itizen empowerment is one of
the best things about our property tax limit.”138 As Ms. Anderson noted, a
renewed a sense of civic engagement and a sense of accountability in elected
officials is another significant byproduct of the cap.
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6. Arguments Against Retaining Proposition 2 ½
In 1980, the majority of residents in 67 of Massachusetts’s 351 cities and
towns voted against Proposition 2 ½.139 The central argument against
Proposition 2 ½, both when it was first enacted and today, is that the 2.5% tax
cap and the 2.5% levy ceiling are arbitrary limits.140 Municipal officials have
aptly noted in recent years that the law has not been significantly updated in
thirty years. Rather than staying responsive to modern needs, the law has
remained static, even though “[t]he local government of 1982 is
unrecognizable compared to today in terms of technology, health care,
mandates, and particularly public education.”141 Along this same vein, the
number of state and federal mandates have exploded since the 1980s.
Proposition 2 ½ bans unfunded state mandates, but has no impact on federal
mandates, nor does it take into the account the cost of implementing mandates
which may not require funding in and of themselves.142
Significantly, Proposition 2 ½ does not take into consideration the actual
cost of providing services, inflation, or other extraneous factors.143 Arguments
for reform or repeal of Proposition 2 ½ tend to focus on the capricious barrier
the law imposes on local governments’ ability to raise revenues.144 Thus,
“[w]hen some budget items increase faster than the cap,” which occurs nearly
every year, “other items must be cut to fit total expenditures under the cap.
As a result, town and school services actually lose ground most years because
of Prop[osition] 2 ½.”145 Strict property tax caps do not make services cost
less; this results in cuts to services.146
Opponents to Proposition 2 ½ point to two specific areas that have led to
ongoing financial issues for many cities and towns. Public employee benefits
(significantly, healthcare costs), and education costs continue to rise.147 While
proponents of Proposition 2 ½ argue that these costs need to be independently
139
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addressed, this argument ignores the fact that while strict property tax caps can
limit the size of government, they cannot affect the cost of the services
themselves.148 With mandated costs, communities are finding that they cannot
afford sharp increases, despite their obligations to pay.149
One of the strongest arguments against Proposition 2 ½ focuses on
inflation. Proposition 2 ½, unlike some strict property tax cap schemes, makes
no allocation for inflation.150 Average yearly inflation has exceeded the 2.5%
cap for twenty-four out of the past thirty-seven years, even reaching doubledigit inflation in a single year.151 Inflation has been below 2.5% for only
thirteen years out of the past thirty-seven years.152
Consequently,
municipalities’ buying power has eroded. As inflation has risen, communities’
abilities to levy taxes in line with inflation has been handicapped.
A 1996 article in CommonWealth Magazine noted that Proposition 2 ½
had “created a new culture for local governments,” forcing local officials to
“look carefully at every spending item,” and having to become “leaner and
more efficient.”153 While this may be true to some extent, efficiency can only
go so far: having one less man on the highway department or reducing the
hours of the town’s library may have a seemingly minimal short-term effect,
but can have a much deeper long-term effect. Similarly, the argument that
caps would produce large savings through “efficiencies” was flawed;
“efficiencies” to one person, such as the closure of a fire station or a library
branch, “may represent the loss of a critical service for another person.”154
The law also makes local governments heavily dependent on state aid,
which tends to fluctuate with economic cycles and state politics.155 While
some proponents of Proposition 2 ½ see this as a positive feature, it is more
properly viewed as a major issue: in times of economic downturn, the need for
municipal services stays the same or increases (i.e. the utilization of public
libraries), while local aid shrinks. Thus, “[t]he success of Proposition 2 ½ was
based on revenue sharing between the state and federal government and cities
and towns. That partnership is shrinking, or ending, and the model no longer
works.”156
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D. The Unintended Consequences of a Strict Property Tax Cap in
Massachusetts
The promise of lower taxes and greater control proved alluring to voters
across the country when faced with the opportunity to implement strict
property tax caps. While different regimes have varying frameworks, all have
been driven by similar desires for greater local control and for lower taxes.157
Despite initial excitement propelling the passage of these laws, outcomes have
been more varied.
Of the seven states that have some form of strict property tax caps, all have
some of the highest property taxes per capita in the United States.158 New
Jersey, which has a strict property tax cap, has the highest property taxes per
capita in the country, at $2,819.159 Within the cohort of states with strict
property tax caps, the lowest per capita property tax rate is seen in Oregon, at
$1,292, which is still the twenty-sixth highest rate in the country.160 Thus,
even in states that have implemented caps, almost all are in the top half of
states in terms of per capita tax rates.161 While it is unclear whether or not
strict property tax caps were implemented to address this issue (and failed to
accomplish what they purported to do), or caused this issue, the fact of the
matter remains that states with strict property tax caps, on average, have far
higher per capita property taxes than states that do not have caps.162
While some commentators point to Massachusetts as a success story in
this regard, success depends on one’s interpretation.
Prior to the
implementation of Proposition 2 ½, Massachusetts had the highest property
taxes per capita in the country.163 Currently, Massachusetts has the eighth
highest property taxes per capita nationwide.164 If municipalities had not
chosen to approve override votes over the years, property taxes in the Bay State
could be lower; however, many municipalities have felt forced to put forward
overrides because necessary revenue cannot be raised under the cap’s rigid
formula.
A number of unexpected consequences have also arisen as a result of the
implementation of strict property tax caps. New York, for example, only
implemented a strict property tax cap in 2012.165 A Cornell University survey
published a year later found that “over 60% of villages and towns and over
157
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80% of cities and counties across New York faced increased fiscal stress due
to the tax cap.”166 Similarly, a story from The Boston Globe, titled “In
Massachusetts, Budgets that Hurt” reflected on slashed municipal services in
the wake of Proposition 2 ½, only eight years after the measure had been
passed into law.167 Ultimately, “[i]n the absence of additional state aid,” local
governments in states which have strict property tax caps “make more drastic
service cuts and increase revenues through overrides and user fees [as
compared to municipalities in states without caps].”168
The other significant goal behind implementing strict property tax caps
was a desire by voters for greater local control. To some degree, strict property
tax caps have accomplished this: in Massachusetts, the increasing number of
proposed override votes illustrates the power voters have in making
meaningful decisions over the future of their communities.169 Proposition 2 ½
has brought many financial issues to the forefront of local elections and town
meetings.170 Yet, despite this increased civic engagement, strict property tax
caps generally do not reduce the size of government.171 While the “fringes”
may be cut in order to save money, it is far more common for local
governments to rely more heavily on other sources of funding, whether that be
petitioning Beacon Hill, or increasing local fees, rather than substantially
shrinking the size and cost of government.172 Many areas of local government
have funding mandates, so the size of government cannot be substantially
reduced, even with strict property tax caps in place.173 Similarly, many costs
that fall on municipalities, such as employee healthcare costs and education
expenses, continue to rise; although local governments have no ability to curb
these costs, they still have to pay for it within this framework.174
The impact of strict property tax caps on municipal finances has been
exacerbated by a reduction in local aid. Municipalities in the Commonwealth
derived (both in 1980 and today) the vast majority of their revenue through
local property taxes.175 In the aftermath of Proposition 2 ½’s passage, cities
and towns, worried about the impact of the cap, successfully achieved an
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agreement with Beacon Hill to increase local aid.176 In the early- to mid-1980s,
Beacon Hill kept this promise: local aid (including general local aid, Chapter
70 (education aid), and school building assistance) continued to rise, reaching
a peak in 1986.177 Over the past three decades, however, local aid levels have
drastically declined.178 In 1986, total local aid, as a percentage of personal
income, was approximately 2.4%.179 That figure fell to 1.7% by 2013.180 If
the Commonwealth was dedicating “the same share of resources to local aid
today” as it did thirty-five years ago, even when adjusting for inflation, cities
and towns would be receiving approximately $1.7 billion more each year.181
While the reduction of local aid was not a consequence of Proposition 2 ½, the
increased reliance of municipalities on local aid is a direct result of the strict
property tax cap.182
Strict property tax caps can have varying impacts based on the makeup of
a community. This Note uses Massachusetts as a case study by examining the
total number of Proposition 2 ½ override votes, both proposed and successful,
that have been taken over three decades. This data paints a picture of the
impact strict property tax caps have had on communities. Significantly, the
relative wealth of a community is indicative of whether or not an override vote
will pass; a community’s decision whether to approve or reject an override
vote impacts what services a municipality can provide.183 This, in turn, creates
greater disparities over time, as wealthy communities continue to provide
services—thereby attracting other well-to-do families—and poorer
communities continue to cut services. While this cycle is fully discussed
below, this fact illustrates the fundamental shortcoming of strict property tax
caps: different communities have vastly different needs. It makes little sense
to impose a uniform constraining measure across an entire state, when each
community has its own challenges to address. Instead, strict property tax caps,
with their “static and insensitive” nature, have “produced greater regional
fiscal disparity” where they have been imposed than might otherwise be
seen.184
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IV. PROPOSITION 2 ½: THE DATA
The data from Massachusetts’s three-and-a-half decade-long experience
with a strict property tax cap illustrates the effectiveness of the law. The
rationale of the strict property tax cap model is that municipalities will be
restrained in spending because they will be restrained in taxing.185
Presumably, if the law functioned the way it was intended to, governments
would “live within their means” under the cap, and thus the need for override
votes would be few. For those override votes that did occur, the success rate
would be low, as voters presumably would not vote against their interests to
increase their own taxes.186 However, by examining over three decades of
data, it becomes clear that Proposition 2 ½ is not working as intended. Since
1983, there have been over 4,000 override votes, resulting in a
disproportionately negative impact on communities with certain economic
makeups.
A. Override Votes Since 1983: A Growing Wave
In 1983, the first communities in the Commonwealth were asked whether
or not they wanted to raise their own property taxes by a percentage greater
than the 2.5% cap.187 That year, 38 override votes were proposed across the
Commonwealth in 28 different communities, ranging from $4,465 to
$10,195,082.188 Of those 38 votes, 11 failed.189 The other 27 votes passed,
thereby raising taxes on voters in those communities by the percentage
necessary to match the amount of money approved.190
From Fiscal Year 1983 through Fiscal Year 1989, 486 override votes were
taken across the Commonwealth.191 More recently, from Fiscal Year 2000
through Fiscal Year 2009, there were 1,182 override votes taken.192 Over the
course of two decades, this represents an increase in the average number of
votes taken from 69 votes per year, to 118 votes per year. This dramatic
increase in the number of proposed override votes—regardless of whether or
not voters ultimately approved or rejected increasing their taxes—indicates a
deeper problem. As time has gone on, communities have found that they are
185
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unable to support municipal services under the 2.5% cap imposed by
Proposition 2 ½. Consequently, selectmen, mayors, and town councils across
the Commonwealth have been forced to ask voters to override the levy limit
and increase their own property taxes. As inflation has eroded the buying
power of each dollar, and as services have become costlier to provide, the
strain imposed by the 2.5% cap has caused increased pressure and has led to a
greater number of override propositions being presented to voters in more
recent years.
1. 351 Cities & Towns: 351 Different Experiences
In order to truly assess the effectiveness of the law, it is necessary to look
at the impact Proposition 2 ½ has had on both the Commonwealth as a whole
and on individual communities with different demographics and makeups.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 351 cities and towns from the
affluent suburbs of Boston to the small villages of the Berkshires.193
Prosperous communities outside of Boston have approved overrides for over
$10 million in a single year, while more rural communities in the central and
western parts of the state have rejected proposed overrides for little more than
$10,000.194 While most communities request larger figures for “general
operating expenses,” other communities ask voters to approve narrowly
defined spending requests—several communities have had over 100 override
votes since 1983.195
From 1983 through 2010, of Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns, 304
have taken at least one Proposition 2 ½ override vote; 47 have never taken an
override vote.196 Of the 304 communities that have held at least one override
vote, a total of 4,499 votes have been taken.197 Voters have approved
overriding the 2.5% cap 1,826 times out of 4,499 votes taken.198 Thus, for all
cities and towns that have taken a Proposition 2 ½ override vote, the average
success rate of a proposed override vote passing is 40.58%. This figure
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indicates that communities are willing—or were willing at some point over the
past thirty years—to approve overriding Proposition 2 ½’s limits and increase
their own property taxes.
Distilling this data down further, a greater understanding of the law’s
impact can be gained by looking at the economic profiles of the communities
that have either approved or rejected override votes. Using median household
income data for each municipality in Massachusetts, and overlaying it with the
success rates of Proposition 2 ½ override votes, allows a more complete picture
of the impact the law has had on different communities.
B. Community Wealth Determining Impact
For the purposes of determining whether or not Proposition 2 ½ override
votes are more successful in wealthy or poorer communities, the following
designations were applied to Massachusetts communities. Communities with
median household incomes below $49,999 were designated as the “low”
category; 32 cities and towns meet this definition. “Low average”
communities have a median household income between $50,000 and $74,999.
This is the largest category, with 164 cities and towns meeting the criteria.
Communities with median household incomes between $75,000 and $99,999
were designated as the “average” category; 105 cities and towns meet this
definition. “High average” communities, totaling 35 cities and towns, have a
median household income between $100,000 and $124,999. Finally, the 15
communities with a median household income exceeding $125,000 were
designated as the “high” category.
Addressing the first category, communities with a “low” median
household income, 25 of the 32 cities and towns have had a Proposition 2 ½
override vote, 7 have not.199 Of the 25 communities that have had an override
vote since 1983, voters approved override measures 27.125% of the time.
The “low average” designation comprises the greatest number of
communities of any of the categories: 164 cities and towns. A total of 132
communities where the median household income is between $50,000 and
$74,999 have taken an override vote, 32 have not.200 In these 132 cities and
towns, voters have approved proposed tax increases 41.612% of the time. This
closely mirrors the overall success rate for the entire Commonwealth, of
40.58%.
With regards to communities with the “average” median household
income designation, 98 communities have taken a Proposition 2 ½ vote, and 7
have not, out of the 105 communities in this category.201 Of the 98
municipalities with a median household income between $75,000 and $99,999
199
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that have had an override vote, voters approved the proposed overrides
31.083% of the time, significantly less frequently than communities in the
“low average” bracket, the designation directly beneath this category.
For communities with the “high average” designation, 34 of the 35 towns
have taken a Proposition 2 ½ override vote.202 The data from municipal votes
from 1983 through 2010 indicates that in towns where the median income is
between $100,000 and $124,999, the success rate for an override vote is
49.325%. This figure jumps drastically for communities with the “high”
median household income designation, where the median household income
exceeds $125,000.203 All 15 communities with this designation have had
Proposition 2 ½ override votes.204 In this category, the success rate tops out at
69.435%.
C. Trends Based on Community Wealth
The overall trends indicated by three decades of voting data makes clear
that voters in wealthier communities are more likely to approve Proposition 2
½ override votes versus communities with lower median household incomes.
To some degree that conclusion is intuitive: wealthier individuals can afford
to increase their own property taxes to pay for municipal services whereas
poorer individuals cannot.205 Within this framework, however, there is a
notable point of pause. While overall the success rate for override votes
increases as median household income increases, the success rate for
“average” communities does not follow this trend.206 Where median
household income was “average,” between $75,000 and $99,999, the
likelihood of overrides decreased, to 31.083%, relative to the “low average”
category. In communities with the “low average” designation, (where median
household income is between $50,000 and $74,999), the success rate of
override votes is much higher, at 41.612%.
This data point could be interpreted to indicate that “low average”
communities are more likely to approve overrides versus their immediately
wealthier counterparts.207 Within the framework that this Note has proposed,
202
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the “average” and the “low average” median household income groups are
fairly large categories compared to the other designations this Note has
identified. The “average” category is comprised of 105 cities and towns. while
the “low average” category is comprised of 164 cities and towns.208
Although a full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, it
does present an interesting opportunity for reflection. Subdividing the “low
average” category (where the median household income is $50,000 to
$74,999) into two parts, a clearer picture forms. Among communities where
the median household income is between $50,000 and $62,499, the likelihood
of a Proposition 2 ½ override vote passing is 36.974%. Where the median
household income level rises to between $62,500 and $74,999, the likelihood
of voters approving a tax increase also rises, to 44.528%. This further division
of the “low average” category reflects the broader data, which indicates that
wealthier communities are more likely to approve override votes versus poorer
communities.209
While it is unclear from the data why communities with the “low average”
designation are more likely to approve override votes versus “average” median
household income communities, the large sizes of both of these categories
reflect greater diversity as compared to the categories at either the top or the
bottom of the medium household income spectrum, with smaller sample sizes.
Greater diversity in community composition, municipal needs, and geography
necessitates different results.210
Additionally, the uptick in approval seen in communities where the
median household income is between $50,000 and $74,999 could reflect the
support of young families for override votes. Young families, who generally
make less money, may be more likely to approve override votes than older
individuals who have greater incomes. This is because override votes are
frequently for public school funding, which generally garners broader support
from those who utilize the public school system compared to those who do
not.211 The ultimate reason behind these disparities is not entirely clear from
the data. The data does, however, clearly illustrate the great diversity of
communities in the Commonwealth, and the difficulty of implementing a “one
size fits all” taxation cap on every community.
What is truly striking from the data is the size of the disparity in supporting
override votes between poorer and wealthy communities. In communities
where the median household income is less than $49,999, Proposition 2 ½
208
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override votes only passed 27.125% of the time.212 In the wealthiest
communities in the Commonwealth, however, where median household
income exceeds $125,000, the success rate of an override vote skyrockets to
69.435%.213 This wide disparity illustrates one of the greatest shortcomings in
the framework of Proposition 2 ½: while the statute itself does not take into
account inflation or individual community needs, wealthy communities can
get around these shortcomings by voting for an override. The model of
Proposition 2 ½ favors wealthy communities whose residents can afford to
absorb tax increases, leading to a bifurcation of services between towns.214
Poorer communities, which cannot afford to approve tax increases, are more
significantly harmed by this model. Residents of poorer communities are often
more dependent on many municipal services than wealthier communities and
yet are unable to achieve override votes to pay for these services.215
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D. Data Overview

Category

1

Proposition 2 ½ Override Votes
Description Number Have
Have
of
Taken
Not
Cities/
an
Taken
Towns
Override an
Vote
Override
Vote
“Low”
32
25
7
Median
Household
Income:
Less than
$49,999

“Low
Average”
Median
Household
Income:
$50,000 $74,999
3
“Average”
Median
Household
Income:
$75,000 $99,999
4
“High
Average”
Median
Household
Income:
$100,000 $124,999
5
“High”
Median
Household
Income:
Greater than
$125,000
OVERALL 2

Success
Rate

27.125%

164

132

32

41.612%

105

98

7

31.083%

35

34

1

49.325%

15

15

0

69.435%

351

304

47

40.58%
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E. Can a “One Size Fits All” Framework Work?
Three decades of data from Massachusetts illustrates how the “one size
fits all” model for strict property tax caps has had a disparate negative impact
on poorer communities versus wealthier communities. Every one of
Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns have funding needs that must be met,
but the ability of many communities to meet their obligations is severely
constrained by a tax framework that can be sidestepped only by wealthier
communities. Other studies of strict property tax caps have found that
“[s]maller and less-densely populated communities tend to experience the
greatest constraint from property tax limitations.”216 A similar pattern is seen
in Massachusetts: successful overrides to fund municipal operating budgets
“have been prevalent in high-income suburbs to the west of Boston, along with
parts of the north and south shores, Pioneer Valley, and the Cape and Islands.
Outside of urban corridors,” in more rural and poorer areas, however, voters
have taken a much harder line on override votes.217 Consequently, “overrides
have allowed wealthier communities to tax themselves more and maintain or
improve services,” while poorer communities have fallen further and further
behind.218
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Proposition 2 ½ was the outgrowth of noble intentions: a desire for smaller
government, lower taxes, and greater civic involvement in local decisionmaking.219 Despite these good intentions, three decades of data make clear
that Proposition 2 ½ has had a disproportionately negative impact on poorer
municipalities, communities that cannot successfully implement override
votes in order to fund necessary municipal services.220
In contemplating alternatives to strict property tax caps, it is important to
keep in mind the original impetus behind them, namely greater voter control
over local spending, as well as limiting tax increases.221 As discussed above,
Proposition 2 ½ has promoted greater civic engagement and has helped to
reduce Massachusetts’s property taxes from being the highest in the United
216
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States in 1980, to a slightly more respectable number eight slot today.222 At
the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the world that spawned strict
property tax caps is not the reality we live with today.223 The outsized negative
impact of Proposition 2 ½ on poorer communities begs the question: what can
be done to allow communities to raise the funds they need, while also being
cognizant of the financial realities many households face?
A. Indexing the Cap to the Rate of Inflation
Perhaps the most feasible and straight-forward reform to Proposition 2 ½
would be to retain the ceiling on the total annual property tax revenue that a
municipality can raise (2.5% of the total assessed value of the community’s
taxable property), while altering the levy limit to either 2.5% per year (of the
total full and fair cash value of all taxable real and personal property) or the
rate of inflation.224 This is similar to the approach California took in its strict
property tax cap, Proposition 13.225
From 1980 to 2010, inflation increased an average of 3.638% per year in
the United States.226 During that time, the highest rate of inflation during one
year was 13.5%, while the lowest annual change was -0.4%.227 Altering the
yearly levy limit cap to either 2.5% or the rate of inflation, whichever is higher,
would be a minor change, with potentially significant consequences. The first
part of Proposition 2 ½ would remain unchanged: the total annual property tax
revenue raised by municipalities could not surpass 2.5% of the assessed value
of all taxable property in the community.228 However, the second part of
Proposition 2 ½ would shift to allow communities to levy an increase in taxes
by 2.5% per year of the total full and fair cash value of all taxable real and
personal property, or the rate of inflation, whichever is higher.
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Such a shift would have two primary benefits. First, it would retain the
civic engagement and voter control over local spending that were central goals
behind the initial push for Proposition 2 ½.229 Municipalities would not be free
to raise taxes as high as they would like: the total annual property tax revenue
raised by a municipality would still be capped at 2.5%. However, this reform,
by indexing levy limit to rate of inflation (or 2.5%, if inflation for a given year
was below that), would allow communities to retain their buying power, power
that is otherwise eroded when inflation increases but the cap does not.230 As
costs increase because of inflation, communities would be able to keep up, and
continue to provide services that might otherwise need to be cut.
B. Capping the Budget
Rather than imposing a cap on the total annual property taxes a
municipality can impose, Massachusetts could look to impose a cap on the
total amount each community’s municipal budget could increase each year.
The tax rate would correspond to whatever was needed to meet the
community’s budget. This method would be similar to New Hampshire’s
approach.231 New Hampshire allows individual cities and towns to adopt their
own limits on local spending and local tax increases.232 This model affords
individual cities and towns a significant amount of latitude: the Granite State
allows voters to “adopt a limit on annual increases in the estimated amount of
local taxes in the . . . proposed budget”, the limit can either be a fixed dollar
amount or a fixed percentage.233
If a cap was instituted on municipal budgets, however, many of the same
issues seen with a cap on the amount taxes can increase would materialize.
Without a provision to account for inflation, a cap—either in a dollar amount
or a certain percentage—would steadily be eroded over time as the buying
power of each dollar decreased. Consequently, a cap on the overall budget,
without addressing the root issues inherent to any strict-cap system, would
prove less than satisfactory.
C. Why Reform? Why Now?
Proposition 2 ½ has, at various times, been heralded as a saving grace for
Massachusetts taxpayers. It has also been lamented as a monster set to destroy
229
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public schools and municipal services.234 As the fortieth anniversary of the
law’s passage approaches, the question remains: why reform Proposition 2 ½?
Despite its flaws, it accomplished much of what it set out to achieve—lower
taxes and greater civic control over municipal budgets.235 This notion,
however, is limited. Although proponents of Massachusetts’s strict property
tax cap achieved their objectives in the short term, when examining the longterm impact of the law, the numerous downsides of Proposition 2 ½ come into
greater focus.
Strict property tax caps present numerous challenges to municipalities,
specifically to poorer communities. The restrictive cap and levy limits have
kept taxes low, but also have constrained municipalities from raising taxes
necessary to pay for heavily utilized municipal services.236 Communities are
further handicapped in providing services because inflation—which has
averaged 3.638% from 1980 through 2010—has constantly outpaced levy
limits.237 Further, local aid, promised by Beacon Hill, has significantly
declined since the mid-1980s.238 Consequently, communities have been facing
increasing pressure due to Proposition 2 ½’s restrictions. Strict property tax
caps have an inherently unsustainable nature as it relates to municipalities
fulfilling their commitment to provide public services, especially, as the
override voting data indicates, with regards to poorer communities.
Change is necessary. While increasing taxes is never a popular
proposition, the reforms suggested here would keep a cap in place: taxes would
not rise with abandon. Rather, the caps would take into account an outside
factor, inflation, in order to allow communities the ability to retain purchasing
power in the face of changing times. Timely reform should be a priority for
Massachusetts legislators: more override votes are being proposed now than
ever before.239 This indicates that local governments cannot operate under the
cap, but instead are increasingly looking for voters to override the cap to fund
the general budget. Wealthier communities are more likely to approve
override votes compared to poorer communities; over time, this has
exacerbated differences between municipalities, as wealthier communities
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have maintained or improved services, while poorer communities have had to
continually cut services as voters refuse to approve overrides.240
Proposition 2 ½, unlike some strict property tax caps in other states, is not
a constitutional amendment—it is a simple law that can be repealed or
amended by the legislature at its will.241 Since 1980, there have been attempts
to repeal the law, though none of have succeeded.242 There is no question that
Massachusetts legislators can amend Proposition 2 ½; the true question is
whether or not the political will exists to effectuate change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Strict property tax caps place arbitrary limits on municipal taxing abilities.
In Massachusetts, as in other states, it makes little sense to impose a uniform
“constraining instrument” as each community has vastly different needs. 243
This issue has been heightened by the fact that the needs of many communities
have changed dramatically since 1980; inflation rates have overwhelmingly
outpaced levy limits; and promises of increased local aid by Beacon Hill have
not materialized.244
Moving forward, there is no one, clear answer. No one wants to pay more
taxes. Given the 40.58% success rate for override votes over the past three
decades, however, it is clear that people will agree to increase their taxes when
municipal services they rely on are in jeopardy.245 Despite this, override votes
do not solve the root problem: if municipal leaders continually need to appeal
to voters because they cannot raise enough money under the current system,
then the system is in need of reform.
Laws are meant to be revisited and revised over time, in order to reflect
the needs of the society that they have been crafted to serve. Proposition 2 ½
has been in place for over three decades without any major revisions.246 The
model it sets forth does not work in today’s day and age. Proposition 2 ½ has
240
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had an outsized disparate impact on poorer communities—those that cannot
afford to increase their own taxes above the cap.247 In order to allow
communities to raise the funds necessary to provide municipal services,
Proposition 2 ½ has to be revisited. Addressing the future of strict property
tax caps, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, is a pragmatic endeavor with reallife consequences for individuals living in affected communities.
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